

# WEBINAR INVITATION

How can cash transfers contribute to addressing child marriage in the MENA region?

DATE: 18 SEPTEMBER 2023

TIME: 15:00 – 16:30 AMMAN TIME– GMT+3

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
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# Girls Not Brides

How can cash transfers contribute to  
ending child marriage

# HOW CASH TRANSFERS CAN CONTRIBUTE TO ENDING CHILD MARRIAGE

As part of a comprehensive approach, social protection – especially cash transfer programmes – can help mitigate the economic and social drivers of child marriage. This thematic brief offers guidance for policymakers, practitioners and advocates to ensure cash transfer programmes contribute towards ending child marriage around the world.



PICTURED: A girl plays in the park in Livingston, Guatemala. Photo: Girls Not Brides/Priscilla Mora Flores/Colectivo Nómada

**Table 1: Summary of studies on the effects of cash transfer programmes on child marriage**

Country	Programme	Type	Impact on child marriage
Malawi	Zomba Pilot Cash Transfer <sup>35,36</sup>	UCT <sup>c</sup>	↓
South Africa	Old Age Pension (OAP) <sup>37</sup>	UCT	↓↑
Kenya	CT for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) <sup>38</sup>	UCT	↔
Malawi	Social Cash Transfer Programme (SCTP) <sup>39</sup>	UCT	↔
Zambia	Multi-Categorical Targeted Grant (MCTG) <sup>40</sup>	UCT	↔
Zimbabwe	Harmonized Social Cash Transfer (HSCT) <sup>41,42</sup>	UCT	↓
Ghana	LEAP 1000 <sup>43</sup>	UCT	↔
Ethiopia	Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP) <sup>44</sup>	UCT	↓
Nepal	Old Age Allowance (OAA) <sup>45</sup>	UCT	↑
Tanzania	Productive Social Safety-Net (PSSN) <sup>46,48</sup>	UCT/CCTE <sup>d</sup>	↔
Malawi	Zomba Pilot Cash Transfer <sup>35,36</sup>	CCTE	↓
Kenya	Adolescent Girls Initiative (AGI) <sup>45</sup>	CCTE	↓
Honduras	Programa de Asignación Familiar (PRAF) <sup>47,48</sup>	CCTE	↔
Mexico	Progres a/Oportunidades <sup>47,48</sup>	CCTE	↓
Pakistan	Female Secondary School Stipend (FSSP) <sup>49,50</sup>	CCTE	↓
Philippines	Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Programme (4Ps) <sup>51</sup>	CCTE	↓
Bangladesh	Female Secondary School Stipend (FSSP) <sup>33</sup>	CCTE/M	↓
India	Kanyashree Prakalpa <sup>52</sup>	CCTE/M	↓
India	Apni Beti Apna Dhan (ABAD) <sup>53,54</sup>	CCTM <sup>e</sup>	↓

**Cash transfers** - should be non-contributory, regular, predictable and well-targeted. Cash transfers include:

- Life-cycle programmes: **Unconditional cash transfers (UCT)** for groups in vulnerable situations, including child grants.
- Poverty-targeted programmes: Unconditional cash transfers, public works programmes, **conditional cash transfers (CCT)** for education, health, delayed marriage
- **Cash plus programmes:** Cash linked to other programmes or services

Table 1 Key	↑	Child marriage increase
	↓	Child marriage decrease
	↔	No measurable change

# Evidence for specific pathways



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1. Household economic security.

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2. a) Education and empowerment.

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2. b) Effects of education and economic security on early and high-risk sexual relations.

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3. Adolescent labour.

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5. Marriage disincentives.


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6. Cash plus and complementary interventions.

# Overall findings

- **Cash transfers can mitigate several of the economic and social drivers of child marriage** through different pathways.
- **Conditional cash transfers (CCT)** - important role in keeping girls in school - **most consistent at reducing the risk of child marriage**
- **Unconditional cash transfers (UCT)** - effective at increasing access to school and in protecting against early and high-risk sex - **does not generally reduce child marriage.**
- **Cash transfers will not change social norms in the short term.** However, in combination with other policies and programmes – especially education – cash transfers can equip girls to resist unequal and harmful social practices and promote inter-generational change.
- **Good evidence that cash transfers in humanitarian contexts improve household food security** - there is currently **no credible** experimental or quasi experimental evidence on the effects of cash transfers on child marriage (Presler-Marshall et al., 2020)

# Recommendations for programme designers and implementers



# Recommendations for researchers

- Focus research on cash transfers in **neglected contexts** where child marriage rates are high, or girls are at heightened risk.
- Research on the **less understood effect pathways**.
- Better understand the **impacts of cash transfers on marriage quality and intra-household relations of child brides**.
- Ensure that research on the effects of cash transfers on child marriage is **measuring the right thing**.



# Recommendations for policy makers



➤ Develop national child marriage strategies that promote policy coherence and cross-sectoral linkages to maximise the concentration of resources and enhance the effectiveness of cash transfers towards ending child marriage.



➤ Ensure the right balance of social sector investment in availability and quality of education and increasing demand through an appropriate mix of cash transfer programmes.



➤ Allocate adequate financing to ensure that cash transfers and other social protection measures cover areas of high child marriage prevalence.



➤ Provide strong national and sub-national leadership of cash transfer programmes.

# KEY TAKEAWAYS

The impact of cash transfers on CEFMU depends on context and the use of conditions:

- **Conditional cash transfers help keep girls in school**, reducing CEFMU and risky sexual behaviours. But they may exclude the most at-risk girls and are difficult to implement well.
- **Unconditional cash transfers help keep girls in school and protect against early and high-risk sex**. But they do not always reduce CEFMU and may lead to earlier marriage in dowry contexts.
- **Cash transfers will not change social norms in the short term but combined with other policies (especially education) they can support girls** to resist unequal and harmful social practices.
- **State-run cash transfers that are part of social protection systems have the most potential to address CEFMU sustainably and at scale, especially if they are predictable and well targeted.**

**Cash transfer programmes are most effective when their objectives are clearly communicated and adolescent girls are involved as active participants.** Prominent community champions also have a role to play

Thank you!

# Impact of cash transfers on child marriage

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Shatha Elnakib, MPH PhD

Johns Hopkins University



# Evidence on child marriage interventions

- Three systematic reviews on CM prevention
- Most recent review conducted by Malhotra and Elnakib including 30 studies
- More evidence on what works to prevent marriage including effectiveness of cash transfers (conditional on education, conditional on delayed marriage, unconditional)



# Consolidated success rate of evaluations to prevent child marriage

Grouped Intervention Categories	Specific Intervention Type	Share of positive findings in all Studies in Category	Share of positive findings in Med-High Quality Studies
<b>Multi-component (16)</b>	1. Multi-path approach to girls' empowerment	<i>3 of 11</i>	<i>1 of 6</i>
	2. Other bundled approaches	<i>1 of 5</i>	<i>0 of 2</i>
<b>Single Component Cash or Asset Transfer (19)</b>	3. Conditional cash or kind transfer for schooling support	<i>8 of 11</i>	<i>8 of 10</i>
	4. Asset transfer conditional on delayed marriage	<i>2 of 5</i>	<i>2 of 4</i>
	5. Unconditional cash transfer for Poverty Alleviation	<i>0 of 3</i>	<i>0 of 3</i>
<b>Single Component Economic opportunity or skills (6)</b>	6. Female job opportunities or livelihood skills training	<i>3 of 3</i>	<i>3 of 3</i>
	7. Gender rights/life skills training	<i>2 of 3</i>	<i>2 of 3</i>
<b>Single Component Other Interventions (5)</b>	8. Community mobilization	<i>1 of 3</i>	<i>1 of 2</i>
	9. School fee elimination	<i>0 of 1</i>	<i>0 of 1</i>
	10. Abstinence only education	<i>0 of 1</i>	<i>0 of 1</i>



# SAMA Project

- SAMA, is a conditional cash transfer program that aims to prevent child marriage by increase girls' retention in school.
- Includes other components such as community awareness sessions with boys, men, and influential community members, on gender-equality and the harmful impacts of child marriage.
- The SAMA Project was launched in August 2021 with a two-Year budget of \$1 million and was implemented in Akkar in North Lebanon
- A payment of \$250 was made in year 1 and \$350 in year 2

Nationality	Intervention		Control	
	N	%	N	%
Lebanese	87	10.28%	17	4.59%
Palestinian	171	20.22%	35	9.50%
Syrian	588	69.50%	318	85.91%
Total	846	100.00%	370	100.00%



# Assessing the impact of SAMA

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- Quasi-experimental evaluation design with intervention and comparison group
- Follow-up throughout the project in addition to baseline, midline and endline evaluation
- Investigating impact on school retention, performance and child marriage



# What is the impact of SAMMA project on child marriage?




- 3% of the girls in the intervention group were married compared to 8.8% in the control group.
- Average age at marriage was 15.91 and it is noteworthy that married girls in the intervention group were statistically significantly but not that meaningfully older than those in the control group (16.08 vs. 15.75 Years old respectively).

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


# Analyzing time to marriage by intervention vs control group

Intervention girls had **0.33 times** the hazard of marriage compared to control girls



# What is the impact of SAMAs on school retention?



Girls in the intervention group had **7.72** times the odds of being in school compared to those in the control. This is statistically significant (pvalue<0.001)

School completion	INTERVENTION		CONTROL	
	N	%	N	%
No	104	11.20%	181	49.30%
Yes	825	<b>88.80%</b>	186	<b>50.70%</b>



# What about grades? Midterm

Intervention more likely to pass (OR=1.15) but not statistically significantly more likely

	Intervention		Control	
Midterm	N	%	N	%
Fail	326	39.40%	70	42.90%
Pass	502	60.60%	93	57.10%
<b>Total</b>	<b>828</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>163</b>	<b>100.00%</b>



# Final What about grades? Finals

Intervention girls 1.39 more likely to pass compared to control but p-value is borderline significant (0.06)

	Intervention		Control	
Final	N	%	N	%
Fail	194	24.90%	56	31.60%
Pass	584	75.10%	121	68.40%
<b>Total</b>	<b>778</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>177</b>	<b>100.00%</b>



# Conclusions from SAMMA

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Cash conditional on school retention is a promising intervention to delay child marriage

Being in school, irrespective of performance, can be a powerful deterrent to school marriage



# HOW CAN CASH TRANSFERS CONTRIBUTE TO ADDRESSING CHILD MARRIAGE IN THE MENA REGION?

REGIONAL ACTION FORUM TO  
END CHILD MARRIAGE IN  
MENA/ARAB STATES (RAF)  
WEBINAR

**Lauren Whitehead**

Social Protection and Gender Lead,  
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**Hashim Zaidi**

Social Policy Specialist  
Social Policy and Social Protection, UNICEF MENARO

# GLOBAL PROGRAMME ACHIEVEMENTS

Summary of achievements  
since 2016

**21 million**  
girls

reached with life skills  
and comprehensive  
sexuality education

**1.2 million**  
girls

supported to enrol in,  
return to, and/or remain  
in school

**58 million**  
community  
members

engaged in dialogues on gender  
equality and child marriage

**700,000** prevention and  
care service delivery points

supported to provide quality  
health, education and protection  
services for girls

**455**  
partnership

established to support  
social protection and girls'  
economic empowerment

**63** research  
and evidence  
products

on ending child marriage  
produced at country level



**8 of the 11** (in the 12 targeted Global Programme countries)  
costed national action plans to end child marriage are  
financed by the government, while global advocacy  
engagements have resulted in 33 countries now having  
costed national action plans, from 7 in 2018

**94** policies and  
legal instruments

addressing child marriage in line with  
international human rights standards  
drafted, proposed or adopted with  
Global Programme support

Child marriage is increasingly recognized as a major **human, child and women's rights violation** with significant impact on social and sustainable development.

# YET

More than **700 million** girls and women alive today were married as children.


**1 billion** girls and women will be married as children by 2030.



# SETTING THE SCENE

## DRIVERS OF CHILD MARRIAGE

## POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF SOCIAL PROTECTION



Poverty



Gender inequality



Lack of access to education



Insecurity and crises



Cultural norms



Wealth inequity

Economic empowerment

Household poverty reduction

Multi-sectoral linkages to services

Social behavior change

Systems strengthening


Reduction in GBV (especially IPV)

Shared household decision-making

Girls' education costs covered

Reach households with at-risk girls

Jobs and livelihoods for parents




# BENEFITS OF LEVERAGING SOCIAL PROTECTION


Social protection can address two of the strongest drivers of child marriage: **poverty** and **gender inequality**

**Almost half of the world is covered by a social protection benefit.**


■ Covered by at least one SP benefit ■ Not covered



**Nearly \$800B was spent on social protection globally in 2021.**



# THE UNIVERSE OF SOCIAL TRANSFERS



Cash transfers are the most common social protection mechanism leveraged to reduce child marriage.




## **Caution on conditions!**

Schooling conditionalities in CCT= lower child marriage, **however:**

- ✓ conditions can easily penalize the most vulnerable
- ✓ costly to monitor compliance and to scale
- ✓ reinforce punitive control of the poor
- ✓ should be facilitated with accompanying measures
- ✓ often lack evaluation comparison to UCTs
- ✓ can be achieved with alternatives such as nudges, SBC, messaging, labelling, contracts/pacts

# SOCIAL PROTECTION BEYOND CASH

Figure 3 Components of a child-sensitive social protection system



UNICEF, 2019

**However, cash transfers are just one component of social protection that can be leveraged for child marriage outcomes.**

Others include:

- In-kind transfers
- Social insurance
- Social service workforce
- Labor and jobs
- Social registries and MIS
- Linkages and access to services
- Cash plus programmes
- Humanitarian cash transfers

**A system in crisis is only as good as the system before the crisis.**

# BENEFITS OF LEVERAGING SOCIAL PROTECTION

<b>SCALE</b>	Reach, esp. rural populations	Global financial investments
<b>TARGETING</b>	Social registries to target families of at-risk girls	Targeting of women and girls, married and unmarried
<b>SOCIAL SERVICE DELIVERY</b>	Integrated social service delivery	Management Information Systems
<b>SHOCK RESPONSE</b>	Humanitarian contexts	Adaptive crisis response
<b>CASH PLUS</b>	Case management and social service workforce	Information, SBC, Nutrition, Health, SRH, Skills, Livelihoods

**But intentional design is critical.**


# EXISTING EVIDENCE

UNICEF INNOCENTI

INTERVENTION VERDICT	AREA	TYPE
Effective!	<b>Income and economic strengthening</b>	Cash transfers, vocational training, favorable job markets
Promising but requires further research!	<b>Systems strengthening</b>	Training to build the capacity of workforce across sectors

**Evidence suggests economic approaches show definitive pattern of success in reducing marriage.**

**Cash transfers**



**'Plus' Component**

- Can alleviate several of the economic and social drivers of child marriage through distinctive pathways, such as improved household economic security and increased access to education.
- Can also decrease violence against women and girls; decrease adolescent girls' sexual debut; and delay adolescent pregnancy.
- Together with cash, can also contribute to girls' health and wellbeing, to their sense of agency, and to a greater say in the decisions that affect them.

# SOCIAL PROTECTION IN THE GLOBAL PROGRAMME

## How can the GPECM move to action?

### Collaborate

- Partner with social protection colleagues who coordinate with Ministries of Social Protection and related ministries

### Advocate

- Elevate compelling evidence on prevalence of child marriage among beneficiaries of social protection programs; data is key

### Target

- Leverage social registries for targeting existing and at-risk girls

### Data

- Collect data on girls who are enrolled in social protection program households, enrolled in school, and married

### Reporting

- Incorporate reporting of child marriage in grievance response mechanisms for beneficiaries

### Linkages


- Develop linkages to support services, referrals, and across ministries

### CREATE LASTING IMPACT FOR GIRLS!



# Social Protection in MENA - Key Issues

- **Significant increase in child poverty:** Due to several shocks including COVID-19, MD Child Poverty has increased to 26%; and, over 10 mi. more children have been pushed into monetary poverty
- **Fragmented and weak systems,** not effectively reaching the most vulnerable and poor (e.g: informal sectors largely uncovered; gender related coverage gaps in some cases); weak engagement with communities
- **Low SP coverage – only 23% of children have access to Social Protection in MENA mainly social assistance/ CTs**
- **UNICEF in MENA reached 1.7 million households directly with humanitarian cash transfers and 1.3 million through national SP systems**
  - **Challenges –** i) Changing targeting approach is challenging unless it's a specific focus within the programme, ii) Benefit adequacy is another constraint which limits ability to address additional vulnerabilities of at-risk youth.
  - How do we turn these challenges into opportunities?



# SOCIAL PROTECTION IN MENA

## Cash Transfers


- Can help mitigate some of the economic and social drivers of child marriage
- **Multipurpose cash transfers** relieving economic pressures and stress (adolescent girls) – PROSPECTS multi-country programme
- **Cash for Education** to keep girls in school/ incentivize re-enrollment (Libya, Lebanon, Jordan)

## Cash Plus

- CT programmes have **Social & Behavioral Change** components to address cultural norms (Sudan)
- **Complimentary interventions** to promote staying in school or provide layered informal education services for out of school (Libya, Jordan)
- Empowering adolescents with appropriate **economic opportunities**- knowledge and skills (e.g. productive grants, coaching) – PROSPECTS

## Systems Strengthening

- **Social Service Workforce** capacity building initiatives (Iraq)
- **Social Protection Policy Advocacy** (Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine)
- **Referral Pathways** within national SP systems (Palestine)



# ANNEX

# SOCIAL PROTECTION TO CURB CHILD MARRIAGE

<b>CASH TRANSFERS</b>	<b>Ethiopia</b> Productive Social Safety Nets Program
<b>CASH PLUS PROGRAMS</b>	<b>Mozambique</b> Child Grant 'Cash and Care' Pilot <b>India</b> Cash Plus + MNREGA (livelihoods) + Targeted Services <b>Kenya</b> Adolescent Girls Initiative - Kenya (AGI-K)
<b>TARGETING AND SERVICE DELIVERY</b>	<b>Ghana</b> Integrated Social Services (ISS) with LEAP CT
<b>LINKAGES TO SERVICES</b>	<b>Nepal</b> Beti Bachau Beti Padau Scheme ('Educate a Girl, Save a Girl')
<b>SKILLS TRAINING AND JOB MARKET PREPAREDNESS</b>	<b>Zambia</b> Sustainable Women's Livelihoods Program
<b>SOCIAL BEHAVIOR CHANGE COMMUNICATION</b>	<b>Benin</b> 'Cash Plus Care - Programme multi-sectoriel'

# GPECM: GOVERNMENTS OF ETHIOPIA AND GHANA

## Case study: Ethiopia's Productive Safety Nets Program (PSNP)

- Between January-April 2021 and the same period in 2022, child marriage increased by 119% across regions worst hit by drought
- PSNP has been found effective in mitigating poverty-related incentives to marry off girls, and in increasing their school enrolment
- Providing income to households indirectly contributed to the creation of an enabling environment where girls have access to the information, life skills and support networks

## Case study: Ghana's Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP)

- Young women married under the age of 15 in Ghana are 9 times more likely to experience sexual IPV compared to women who were not- the highest likelihood among countries with comparable data in Africa
- LEAP reduces IPV and has potential to reduce child marriage further through multiple pathways, including integrated social services

# GOVERNMENT OF BENIN

## CASH PLUS CARE - PROGRAMME MULTI-SECTORIEL

**30.7%** of girls are married before 18

### • **Increased access of girls to integrated services**

- +57,000 girls/adolescents received child marriage prevention and care services in 2022
- +39,952 schoolgirls with school kits are kept in school and protected from child marriage
- 100% of intervention villages have a village monitoring committee active against VFE/ME

### • **Community engagement of parents and religious leaders**


- 94% of children surveyed know how to report VFE or ME compared to 40% at baseline
- 96% of parents know at least 3 disadvantages compared to 22% at baseline

### • **Social mobilization of adolescent girls and boys**

- of boys/adolescents educated on positive masculinity including SSR, GHM (+ 26,700 in 2022)
- of children/adolescents and young people (+ 88,000 in 2022)

### **Lessons Learned**

- Cash plus care is a viable model
- Cash can be used to keep girls in school with complementary components (e.g. school kits)
- Parents and boys must be engaged
- Religious leaders are critical influencers
- Community sensitization and mobilization



Achieving more inclusive social protection –  
evidence and models for impact

# Gender Responsive Approaches to Social Protection

Example from Lebanon: Haddi Child Grant

Elie El Rawadi  
May Abi Samra

unicef   
for every child

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# Surviving without the basics

## The ever-worsening impact of Lebanon's crises:

- Currency depreciation, rising inflation, increasingly scarce jobs on top of a protracted refugee crisis
- More than 50% of the population live in different forms of deprivation<sup>1</sup>:
  - 9 out of 10 of Syrians cannot afford SMEB<sup>2</sup>
  - Limitation of mobility for girls, increase in child marriage, period poverty
  - Two-third of children between the age of 0-4 years are found to be deprived
  - Compared to the needs, there is limited coverage in social assistance programmes, coinciding with the near collapse of public services.

1 Multidimensional poverty in Lebanon (2019-21)

2 Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (2020)

3 Lebanon – 2019 Multidimensional Poverty Index (2021)





# The Haddi Child Grant at a Glance


Haddi, meaning “next to me”, is a national social assistance programme for children launched in June 2021, till February 2023.


- ‘Haddi’ was launched as a part of social grants to complement poverty-targeted social assistance programmes in collaboration with the Ministry of Social Affairs
- Haddi provided **monthly cash grants** of US\$40-80 to **130,000 recipients** including Lebanese, Syrian and Palestinian
- UNICEF partners identified **vulnerable children**, particularly those at risk of malnutrition, child labour, or child marriage, or excluded from learning, and those with disabilities.
- Haddi is an **integrated programme**, linking cash transfers with other essential services, behaviour change communication and household visits for follow-up.


# Gender-responsive components

## Lebanon's Haddi programme

### Inclusion of vulnerable trans individuals

 **Beneficiary selection:** Trans among most vulnerable populations.<sup>1</sup> Haddi **targets trans individuals** identified through UNICEF partners.

 **IDs and payment:** Protocol for **payment/cash distribution** of trans beneficiaries due to mismatch btw gender expression/ ID through participatory approach. Use of preferred pronoun. Coordination with money transfer agency to **protect trans beneficiaries' identities** and ensure cash assistance delivered in an **ethical and safe way** at payment points.

 **Protection:** Ensure confidentiality of trans beneficiaries. Mitigation measures to minimize risks and provide assistance **protect from harm and avoid transphobia**. Zero tolerance policy.

### Contributing to Gender equality


- Removed access barriers among gender minorities, women and girls
- Promote income security and resilience
- Improved health, education and psychosocial well-being
- Increased protection (GBV, PSEA)


<sup>1</sup> Human Rights Watch, "[Don't Punish Me for Who I Am](#)" (2019)


# Gender-responsive components


## Lebanon's Haddi programme


### Responding to the needs of girls and women

 **Policy:** New social protection policy is gender-responsive aiming to strengthen legislation and expand access to social assistance particularly among women, girls and other gender minorities. Developed in consultation with UN Women and women-lead groups looks at data to identify barriers and aims

 **Operational readiness:** Developed manuals/scripts that includes guidance on key operational issues affecting women and girls' access to benefits (divorced/separated women not receiving assistance, GBV disclosures, etc) in Q&A and shared with service providers

 **Protection:** Service providers (call centre, money agents) trained on protection, gender (tackling their attitudes on gender, GBV and PSEA for safe detection, case management and referrals, including relevant and applied scenarios. Zero tolerance policy for confidentiality and PSEA.

 **Linkages to complimentary services:** support for PLW, safe spaces for female survivors or at risk of GBV and child marriage, case management, and psychosocial support

 **M&E:** PDMs and evaluation looks into gender-disaggregated data and gender analysis.

### Contributing to Gender equity

- Removed access barriers among gender minorities, women and girls
- Promote income security and resilience
- Improved health, education and psychosocial well-being
- Increased protection (GBV, PSEA)

# Lessons learned

## Gender-responsive social protection

- **Push factor** increase in number of women and girls accessing safe spaces + GBV case management + Lebanese + more married/ at risk girls accessed case management
- **Proper timely communication** negative repercussions of abrupt suspension on GBV survivors (dropping of important priorities)
- **AGs Mitigation of risks** caregivers discovering cash assistance to girls. Need for proper action plan with girls to mitigate risks
- **Monitoring:** post distribution monitoring that mainstreams gender

# Lessons learned

## Gender-responsive social protection

- **Remove barriers don't replicate them**
- **Details matter a great deal** to make programmes gender-responsive. Strengthen protection and gender components across the programme cycle
- **Innovate:** UNICEF's own cash transfer programmes offer a unique opportunity to innovate and use the lessons learned to transfer to bigger national schemes
- **Someone has to pay for the +:** successful approaches for cash+ require someone to pay for the services. Challenges in referrals, follow up and maintaining services for vulnerable children

# Thank you

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